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Have Reforms Reconciled Health Rights Litigation and 
Priority Setting in Costa Rica?
alessandro luciano and alex voorhoeve
Abstract 
The experience of Costa Rica highlights the potential for conflicts between the right to health and 
fair priority setting. For example, one study found that most favorable rulings by the Costa Rican 
constitutional court concerning claims for medications under the right to health were either for 
experimental treatments or for medicines that should have low priority based on health gain per unit of 
expenditure and severity of disease.1 In order to better align rulings with priority setting criteria, in 2014, 
the court initiated a reform in its assessment of claims for medicine. This paper assesses this reform’s 
impact on the fairness of resource allocation. It finds three apparent effects: (1) a reduction in successful 
claims for experimental medication, which is beneficial; (2) an increase in the success rate of medication 
lawsuits, which is detrimental because most claims are for extremely cost-ineffective medications; and 
(3) a decline in the number of claims for medicine, which is beneficial because it forestalls such low-
priority spending. This paper estimates that, taking all three effects into account, the reform has had a 
modest net positive impact on overall resource allocation. However, it also argues that there is a need for 
further reforms to lower the number of claims to low-priority medicines that are granted.
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Introduction 
The right to health is enshrined in supranational 
covenants and in more than 100 national consti-
tutions.2 To satisfy its demands, governments must 
allocate substantial resources toward meeting 
people’s health needs. However, the right to health 
does not require that each person receive all nec-
essary medical treatment, no matter what the cost. 
Instead, when, due to resource constraints, it is not 
possible to meet everyone’s needs, it requires that 
decisions about whose health needs should be met 
are made fairly and accountably.3 While there is a 
range of reasonable opinion on how to specify cri-
teria for fair priority setting in detail, there is broad 
agreement that these should track the proper aims 
of the health sector, which are to increase popu-
lation health and reduce inequalities in access to 
health services and in health-related quality of life.4
In many Latin American countries, it has 
proven challenging to establish a process for judi-
cial decision making on claims under the right to 
health that is fully consistent with this imperative 
to set priorities fairly and accountably.5 Costa Rica 
provides a case in point. While Costa Rica’s Consti-
tution does not contain an explicit right to health, 
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court 
(known as Sala IV) has derived a right to health 
from the right to human life (art. 21), the right to 
social security protection (art. 73), and internation-
al human rights treaties. This right entitles citizens 
to public and preventative health services as well as 
medical care. 
In a landmark case in 1997, the court ruled in 
favor of the provision of antiretroviral therapy for 
people living with HIV/AIDS. This ruling led to an 
explosion of health rights litigation. The decision 
regarding antiretroviral therapy has been cited as 
an example of how litigation can redress discrim-
inatory decisions.6 Furthermore, later evaluation 
of the intervention has suggested it was consistent 
with fair priority setting.7 However, subsequent 
cases have highlighted the potential for conflict 
between court decisions and reasonable priority 
setting. For example, in 2001, Vera Salazar Navarro 
challenged the Costa Rican social security institu-
tion (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, referred 
to as CCSS) for refusing to cover the branded 
medication she was prescribed for her multiple 
sclerosis. (The CCSS had offered to reimburse a 
less expensive generic alternative instead.) The 
court ruled in favor of Navarro, arguing that the 
CCSS had breached the patient’s right to health by 
refusing to pay for the exact drug prescribed.8 In 
this case, the court’s ruling undermined effective 
and fair priority setting, since its decision allocat-
ed substantial resources to a use with virtually no 
incremental benefit. In another controversial case 
in 2003, the court obliged the CCSS to pay for the 
treatment of Gaucher disease for a young girl at an 
annual cost of US$160,000—equivalent at the time 
to 38 times the GDP per capita—for the remainder 
of the patient’s life, overruling the CCSS’s medical 
experts, who had judged that the cost was far out of 
proportion to the benefits.9 In 2007, the court even 
appeared to declare explicit priority setting illegal 
by arguing that the CCSS could not decline treat-
ment for “eminently economic reasons.”10
Cases such as these are not incidental. In an 
important study in this journal, Ole Frithjof Nor-
heim and Bruce Wilson classified a random sample 
of medication-related lawsuits filed in Costa Rica 
in 2008; the authors used common priority setting 
criteria, including size of the predicted health gain, 
cost-effectiveness, size of the disease burden, and 
the quality of evidence available for how a medica-
tion performed on these criteria. They found that 
73% of successful claims were for experimental or 
otherwise low-priority medications.11 This result is 
concerning, since it is estimated that 9% of all CCSS 
spending on medicines is driven by court orders.12 
These findings lent support to complaints 
by the CCSS that the court’s health rights deci-
sions were harming its capacity to manage scarce 
resources fairly because magistrates lacked the 
knowledge necessary to evaluate medications. In 
response to this criticism, in 2014, with support 
from the World Bank, the court initiated a joint 
program with the Cochrane Collaboration (a UK-
based nonprofit organization of medical experts 
who cooperate to produce credible and accessible 
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health information). Before the reform, magistrates 
would typically accept the evidence of the treating 
physician. After the reform, the court can (and in 
nearly three-quarters of cases does) refer the case 
to one of ten forensic clinics around the country, 
where a doctor investigates the patient’s medical 
records, performs a physical examination, and 
evaluates the appropriateness of the prescribed 
medication using the Cochrane medical databas-
es. (These investigations are done free of charge 
to the claimant. This process has made the court 
more reliant on evidence-based medicine.) But it is 
important to note that the Cochrane reviews only 
summarize the quality of evidence for the effective-
ness of a medication; they do not include evidence 
on cost-effectiveness or severity of disease. 
Another recent study in this journal—pub-
lished by Olman Rodríguez Loaiza, Sigrid Morales 
Carrasco, Norheim, and Wilson—evaluates the 
impact of this reform.13 They compare claims for 
medication post-reform (from 2016) with Norhe-
im and Wilson’s pre-reform sample (from 2008). 
They find that this reform has had two effects: (1) 
among successful claims, a shift from experimental 
to higher-priority medications and (2) an increase 
in the success rate of medication lawsuits. They 
tentatively conclude that the new process has led to 
modest gains in fairness.14 
The data these authors have generated is of 
great value, especially given the paucity of infor-
mation on the impacts of ways of institutionalizing 
the right to health in Latin America.15 However, 
their analysis has three shortcomings. First, they 
do not establish the statistical significance of the 
differences they observe. Second, they miss an 
important potential effect of the reform, which is 
that it may have changed the number of medica-
tion cases brought to the court. Third, they do not 
provide a detailed analysis of the joint impact of 
the possible effects of the reform. Here, we address 
these shortcomings. We first analyze Rodríguez 
Loaiza et al.’s data and show that the two effects 
they identify are indeed statistically significant. 
We also demonstrate that the number of medica-
tion cases brought to court declined significantly 
post-reform. We then evaluate the joint impact of 
these potential effects on the assumption (which 
we argue is plausible) that the CCSS focuses its 
non-court-mandated spending on high-priority 
interventions. We show that if one considers only 
the change in the success rate and the reduction in 
approved claims to experimental (unproven) med-
ications, then, contrary to Rodríguez Loaiza et al.’s 
judgment, post-reform health resource allocation 
is likely to be less fair. (This is primarily because, 
even post-reform, low-priority medications make 
up the majority of successful claims. Consequently, 
the increase in the success rate of claims generates a 
net increase in expenditure on low-priority drugs.) 
Furthermore, we show that if one also considers 
the reduction in the number of medication claims 
after the reform, then it is plausible that overall re-
source allocation is fairer post-reform. We end by 
suggesting that to reduce the tension between judi-
cial decision making on individual claims and fair 
priority setting, the process of evaluating claims 
should take account of cost-effectiveness and indi-
vidual disease burden.
Data analysis
In 2008, pre-reform, the Sala IV dealt with 192 
claims for medications. Norheim and Wilson 
randomly selected 37 of the winning cases and 
classified them according to the effectiveness of the 
medicine, the severity of the condition it addresses, 
its cost-effectiveness, and the quality of the evi-
dence available.16 In 2016, post-reform, the Sala IV 
dealt with 128 claims for medications. Rodríguez 
Loaiza et al. analyzed the entire population of suc-
cessful cases using the same criteria, which were 
operationalized in the manner explained in Table 1.
Rodríguez Loaiza et al. draw on these crite-
ria to create an overall priority ranking into four 
classes: I (high priority); II (medium priority); III 
(low priority); and IV (experimental). They do so as 
follows. A medicine qualifies as high priority if and 
only if it scores in category I on all four criteria. It 
qualifies as medium priority if and only if it scores 
in category II on at least one criterion and in cate-
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gory I or II on all other criteria. It qualifies as low 
priority if and only if it scores in category III on at 
least one criterion and in category I, II, or III on all 
other criteria.17 Drugs are classified as experimental 
if there is insufficient evidence of effectiveness as 
judged by a trustworthy health technology agency.18
Table 2 reports Rodríguez Loaiza et al.’s 
findings regarding the distribution of successful 
cases across priority classes. (We remove from their 
post-reform data the five cases they could not clas-
sify, leaving 93 observations.) This explains why the 
percentages in Table 2 differ slightly from the ones 
they report. We tested whether the distribution of 
cases across priority classes is different before and 
after the reform, using a chi-square test of inde-
pendence, with the null hypothesis being that the 
two distributions are the same and the alternative 
hypothesis that they are not. The p-value of this 
test is 0.046. Accordingly, we can reject the null 
hypothesis with a reasonable degree of confidence. 
(Although we use a chi-square statistic, a Fischer’s 
exact test might be appropriate instead, since if the 
pre- and post-reform samples are drawn from the 
same population, the expected frequencies in two 
cells are marginally smaller than 5. Fortunately, the 
choice of test does not affect our conclusion, as the 
exact test gives a p-value of <0.01.19) The final row 
reports the contribution to this finding made by 
the shift in the share within each priority class. It 
reveals that the overwhelming majority of the shift 
is driven by the change in the share of successful 
cases in priority classes I (high priority) and IV 
(experimental). These findings support the claims 
made by Rodríguez Loaiza et al. about the distri-
butional shift that has coincided with the reform.
Table 3 reports their findings regarding the 
success rate of all claims for medicines, supple-
mented by the results of our analysis. We tested 
Rodríguez Loaiza et al.’s claim that there was an 
increase in the success rate of medication lawsuits 
using a two-proportions Z-test, with the null hy-
pothesis that the pre-reform litigation success rate 
is greater than or equal to the post-reform success 
rate. The p-value of this test is 0.0004. (Some might 
be concerned about the sample sizes not being very 
large, and argue instead for the use of a Fisher exact 
test. Reassuringly, the Fisher exact test gives almost 
identical p-values.20) Accordingly, we reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the post-reform suc-
cess rate is indeed higher.
We now consider a further difference between 
pre- and post-reform data that is not discussed 
by Rodríguez Loaiza et al.: that the reform, by 
typically adding a stage to evidence gathering—a 
forensic doctor’s report—might have affected the 
number (and share) of medication claims. Even 
though such a report comes at no direct financial 
cost to claimants, it involves further time and ef-
fort, including being examined by a new doctor. 
These represent burdens and therefore possible 
Table 1. Rodríguez Loaiza et al.’s criteria for priority classification
Note: QALYs are quality-adjusted life years, a measure of health-related quality of life, in which one year in perfect health (or its equivalent) is 1, 
death is 0, and a year in a condition that impairs quality of life without rendering it not worth living is rated between 0 and 1, depending on the 
severity of impairment.
# Compared to standard intervention
## Compared to normal healthy life expectancy
Criterion Measure Grading
Effectiveness QALY gain# I > 1 QALY
II < 1 & > 0.5 QALY
III < 0.5 QALY
Severity of disease QALY loss## I > 5 QALY loss
II > 1 QALY loss < 5 QALY loss
III < 0.5 QALY loss
Cost-effectiveness Cost per QALY gained I < 1 GDP per capita
II > 1 GDP per capita < 3 GDP per capita
III > 3 GDP per capita
Quality of evidence Types of published evidence I Meta-analysis or randomized trial
II Observational, non-comparative studies
III Single case reports 
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deterrents. Moreover, the existence of this new pro-
cess may have made citizens less likely to advance 
claims for medications of unproven effectiveness. 
These factors would lead one to expect a decline 
in claims for medication. As Table 4 reveals, this 
is indeed what happened. It reports the results of 
a two-proportions Z-test, with the null hypothe-
sis being that the pre-reform share of medication 
claims is smaller than or equal to the post-reform 
share. The probability (p) of finding the observed 
proportions under this hypothesis is 0.0005. We 
conclude that the post-reform claims to medication 
are a significantly lower proportion of all cases. 
Effects of the reform on resource allocation
We have found three significant differences be-
tween the pre- and post-reform situation. Of course, 
these differences may have causes other than the 
reform. But if we assume that they were due to the 
reform, how should we judge its impact? In this 
section, we answer this question. We proceed step 
by step, starting with the impact of the change in 
the distribution of accepted claims in isolation and 
then adding the increase in the success rate and the 
decrease in the number of cases brought.
If we focus on accepted claims alone, it is 
straightforward to see that the shift away from 
purely experimental drugs (class IV) documented 
in Table 2 leads to fairer resource allocation. One 
way of establishing this is to consider the cumula-
tive distribution of accepted claims across priority 
classes, which is given in the “accepted claims” sec-
tion of Table 5. The post-reform situation constitutes 
an improvement over the pre-reform situation if the 
post-reform cumulative distribution over priority 
classes ordered from I through IV is, at every point, 
at least as great as the pre-reform cumulative dis-
tribution, and strictly greater at some point. Table 
5 reveals that the post-reform distribution is indeed 
an improvement in this sense. 
Because fairness depends on multiple criteria 
(including health gain and reduction of inequali-
ty), it is more difficult to establish just how much 
of an improvement the post-reform distribution 
of accepted claims is. For simplicity, we focus on 
generating a rough estimate of the reform’s impact 
on the health gain criterion.
The idea is to estimate how much total health 
gain is purchased for a given quantity of resourc-
Table 2. Distribution of successful cases across priority classes
Share of cases in priority class (%) p-value
I II III IV
0.046
Pre-reform (2008, N = 37) 2.7 27.0 48.6 21.6
Post-reform (2016, N = 93) 16.1 18.3 55.9 9.7
Contribution to chi-square statistic (%) 48.5 12.2 3.2 36.1
Table 3. Success rate of litigation for the provision of medicine
Period Number of cases Success rate p-value
Pre-reform (2008) 192 57.9%
0.0004
Post-reform (2016) 128 76.6%
Table 4. Litigation for the provision of medicine
Period Amparo cases (for protection of constitutional rights) Claims for medication Share of medication cases p-value
Pre-reform (2008) 16,345 192 1.2%
0.0005
Post-reform (2016) 15,782 128 0.8%
Source: Sala Constitutional de Costa Rica, Consolidado de datos generales: Estadísticas de asuntos votados por la Sala Constitucional, desglosada 
por año, tipo de asunto, término y tema. The 2008 data was found at https://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/index.php/2016-06-27-
17-08-39/item/64-4-cantidad-de-asuntos-entrados-por-tipo-de-asuntos-ampa [accessed July 22, 2019, but the linked data was later removed; the 
2008 number corresponds to 2008 data mentioned in Norheim and Wilson (see reference 1)]. The 2016 data is from https://salaconstitucional.
poder-judicial.go.cr/index.php/estadisticasv1.
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es that are spent in line with the pre-reform and 
post-reform distributions of accepted claims. To 
this end, we require an estimate of the gain in 
QALYs for each successful claim in a priority class. 
We used the average individual QALY gain from 
the data provided in Norheim and Wilson and in 
Rodríguez Loaiza et al., filling in some lacunae in 
their data. Furthermore, we required an estimate 
of cost per QALY gained in each priority class. 
We again took the averages in the data provided 
by Norheim and Wilson and Rodríguez Loaiza et 
al. (All cost-effectiveness measures were expressed 
in GDP per capita per QALY for the relevant base 
year.) Next, we required an estimate of the share of 
expenditure devoted to each priority class. We as-
sumed that for each successful claim in a class, the 
expenditure is the estimated individual QALY gain 
in that class (the “quantity of health purchased”) 
multiplied by the indicative cost per QALY in that 
class (the “purchase price”). Finally, we assumed 
that expenditure in each class is transformed into 
QALYs by dividing the volume of expenditure by 
the indicative cost per QALY for that class.
The upshot is reported in the top two rows and 
the “accepted claims” section of Table 6. (The cal-
culations underlying it are in our online appendix.) 
It is noteworthy that the indicative cost per QALY 
for class III (low priority) is very high, in excess of 8 
times GDP per capita per QALY, and that for class 
IV, it is extremely high, in excess of 32 times GDP per 
capita per QALY. This implies that expenditure on 
these medications is many times less cost-effective 
than expenditure on high-priority interventions. It 
is also noteworthy that, post-reform, the estimat-
ed expenditure shares shift principally from class 
IV (experimental) toward class III (low priority). 
To estimate the effect of this shift, we calculate 
the total number of QALYs generated for a given 
amount of expenditure on accepted claims pre- and 
post-reform, taking 100 times GDP per capita as an 
illustrative amount. The blue highlighted cells in 
the right-hand side of the “QALY gain” rows give 
the upshot: there is a marked, roughly 50% im-
provement in the number of QALYs gained per unit 
of expenditure on accepted claims. Equivalently, 
one can say that the estimated cost-effectiveness 
of expenditure on accepted claims falls from close 
to 9 times GDP per capita per QALY to close to 6 
times GDP per capita per QALY. In this respect, the 
reform is a success.
However, this result of course fails to con-
sider the impact of the increase in the acceptance 
rate of claims. Even post-reform, low-priority 
and experimental medications together make up 
Table 5. Proportion of claims leading to spending in each priority class (%)
Deterred Rejected Accepted 
Priority class I# I# I II III IV
Accepted
Pre-reform 2.7 27.0 48.6 21.6
Post-reform 16.1 18.3 55.9 9.7
Cumulative pre-reform 2.7 29.7 78.4 100
Cumulative post-reform 16.1 34.4 90.3 100
Rejected and accepted
Pre-reform 42.1 1.6 15.6 28.1 12.5
Post-reform 23.4 12.4 14.0 42.8 7.4
Cumulative pre-reform 43.7 59.3 87.4 100
Cumulative post-reform 35.8 49.8 92.6 100
Deterred, rejected, and accepted
Pre-reform 0.0 42.1 1.6 15.6 28.1 12.5
Post-reform 31.0 16.2 8.5 9.7 29.6 5.1
Cumulative pre-reform 43.7 59.3 87.4 100
Cumulative post-reform 55.6 65.3 94.9 100
# By assumption
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nearly two-thirds of successful claims and, by our 
estimate, more than nine-tenths of the expenditure 
on approved claims. Consequently, the increase in 
the success rate of claims will lead to a correspond-
ing increase in expenditure on low-priority and 
experimental medications, which may counteract 
the salutary effects of the reduction in the share of 
experimental treatments among approved claims. 
Further analysis is required to establish the net 
effect of these opposing forces.
Such analysis must rely on an assumption 
about the use to which the CCSS puts those re-
sources that it is not compelled to spend on meeting 
successful claims. While, as in every health system, 
there is in Costa Rica scope for improvements in 
efficiency, there is also reason to assume that the 
CCSS generally and effectively directs resources 
toward improving population health and reducing 
health-related inequalities.21 Expert reviews of the 
health system, which is to a large extent adminis-
tered by the CCSS, have noted the attainment of 
near-universal health coverage for an extensive 
package of services. They also emphasize Costa 
Rica’s excellent population health indicators (such 
as life expectancy and maternal mortality) in 
comparison with countries with a similar GDP 
per capita.22 Moreover, these reviews document 
the health system’s focus on primary care, which 
typically provides high-priority interventions that 
reach all parts of the population.23 Public sector 
health resource allocation appears to be substan-
tially pro-poor. For example, the poorest make the 
greatest use of public health services, and 30% of 
government health spending goes to the poorest 
20% of the population.24 This likely contributes 
to Costa Rica’s comparatively low inequality in 
lifetime health.25 More specifically in relation to 
medicines, the CCSS’s Official Medicines List is 
drawn up by expert doctors and pharmacists in line 
with reasonable criteria, including efficacy, safety, 
the ratio of costs to benefits, impact on the financial 
sustainability of the system, and the ability to en-
sure that all segments of the population have access 
to these medicines and can be expected to use them 
as prescribed.26 This list has been held up by the 
World Health Organization as an example of the 
optimal use of scarce resources.27 
A recent study on the cost-effectiveness of 
marginal health expenditure by governments 
around the world supports the idea that it qualifies 
Deterred Rejected Accepted
Priority class I I I II III IV Total
GDP per capita per QALY 0.5# 0.5# 0.3## 2.3## 8.2## 32.6##
QALY gain per individual 2.4## 1.6## 1.1## 0.7##
Accepted 
Expenditure share pre-reform (%) 0.2 9.1 41.8 49.0 100
Expenditure share post-reform (%) 1.5 7.9 62.2 28.4 100
QALY gain per 100 GDP per capita, pre-reform 0.6 4.0 5.1 1.5 11.2
QALY gain per 100 GDP per capita, post-reform 4.8 3.5 7.6 0.9 16.8
Rejected and accepted 
Expenditure share pre-reform (%) 42.1 0.1 5.3 24.2 28.4 100
Expenditure share post-reform (%) 23.4 1.1 6.0 48.1 21.4 100
QALY gain per 100 GDP per capita, pre-reform 84.2 0.4 2.3 2.9 0.9 90.7
QALY gain per 100 GDP per capita, post-reform 46.8 3.7 2.7 5.8 0.7 59.6
Deterred, rejected and accepted 
Expenditure share pre-reform (%) 0.0 42.1 0.1 5.2 24.2 28.4 100
Expenditure share post-reform (%) 31.0 16.2 0.8 4.2 32.9 15.0 100
QALY gain per 100 GDP per capita, pre-reform 0.0 84.2 0.4 2.3 2.9 0.9 90.7
QALY gain per 100 GDP per capita, post-reform 61.9 32.3 2.5 1.9 4.0 0.5 103.1
Table 6. Indicators of cost-effectiveness, individual gain, expenditure, and overall QALY gain for claim-related expenditure
# Mid-point of range for priority class specified by Norheim and Wilson
## Averages drawn from data supplied by Norheim and Wilson and Rodríguez Loaiza et al. and further research
a. luciano and a. voorhoeve / general papers, 283-293
290
D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 9    V O L U M E  2 1    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal
as high priority on at least one central criterion. It 
estimates that the cost-effectiveness of marginal 
health spending in middle- and high-income coun-
tries (of which Costa Rica is a member) lies between 
0.18 and 0.71 of per capita GDP per QALY.28 These 
assessments fall well within Rodríguez Loaiza et 
al.’s <1 of per capita GDP per QALY requirement 
for high-priority interventions. 
These findings are consistent with an as-
sumption that the CCSS focuses on interventions 
that fall within the high-priority category. On 
this assumption, and supposing that court orders 
do not lead to new resources being added to the 
CCSS budget, resources that the CCSS remains 
at liberty to allocate because a person’s claim is 
rejected flow to high-priority interventions, while 
court-mandated spending on anything other than 
high-priority medications displaces high-priority 
spending. Some evidence of such displacement is 
provided by interviews with senior health officials 
in Costa Rica, who mention that health providers 
need to reallocate resources to accommodate the 
court’s rulings.29 Further evidence for the likelihood 
of such displacement comes from the CCSS’s stated 
aim to keep spending on medicines to 8–10% of the 
health budget.30 This suggests that court-mandated 
spending may well impair the provision of drugs on 
the Official Medicines List, or the expansion of this 
list to include new high-priority medications.
We shall therefore proceed under the as-
sumption that ordinary CCSS spending is on 
high-priority interventions. For concreteness, we 
shall assume that expenditure on such interven-
tions, on average, comes in at 0.5 GDP per capita 
per QALY (this is the mid-point of priority class 
I, and a reasonable estimate given the aforemen-
tioned study on the cost per QALY of marginal 
government expenditure on health in middle- and 
high-income countries; our qualitative results are, 
fortunately, robust to changing this assumption to 
a cost-effectiveness of general spending of slightly 
less than 3 GDP per capita). We can then, again, 
use our two tests to compare the fairness of pre- 
and post-reform claim-related expenditure. Let 
us start with the claim-related distributions by 
priority class, which are reported in the “rejected 
and accepted claims” section of Table 5. Clearly, the 
post-reform distribution does not constitute an un-
ambiguous improvement. Indeed, the distribution 
associated with the pre-reform policy is superior for 
priority classes I and II, and only somewhat worse 
after that. Our first test is therefore inconclusive.
Our second test is a comparison of the benefits 
generated per unit of claim-related expenditure, 
which is reported in the “rejected and accepted 
claims” section of Table 6. The way to interpret it 
is as follows. Suppose that one sets aside 100 GDP 
per capita to deal with claims. If a claim is rejected, 
money flows toward unconstrained high-priority 
expenditure. If a claim is accepted, money is spent 
in line with the formula outlined above for accept-
ed claims in each priority class (in proportion to 
both the individual QALY gain per claim and the 
claim’s indicative cost per QALY). Because uncon-
strained spending is, according to our indicators, 
far more cost-effective than expenditure on accept-
ed claims, the detrimental effect of the increase in 
the acceptance rate swamps the beneficial effect 
of the reduction in expenditure on experimental 
treatments. As revealed in the orange-highlighted 
cells, the upshot is a fall in QALYs generated by 
around one-third. We conclude that if one focuses 
solely on the success rate effect and the shift away 
from experimental treatments, then, contrary to 
Rodríguez Loaiza et al., on one important criterion 
for fair priority setting, the reform is likely to have 
worsened the situation.
This negative conclusion regarding the po-
tential effects of the reform depends, however, on 
ignoring the reform’s apparent deterrent effect on 
the number of claims for medication. As discussed 
in Table 4, compared to the pre-reform sample year, 
the post-reform sample year contains a reduction of 
around one-third in the share (and number) of writs 
of protection for medicines. If this reduction is due 
to the increased barriers to getting such a claim ap-
proved, then one must also consider the funds that 
the CCSS can now spend freely due to this drop. On 
this assumption, we again review our two indicators 
for the effects of the reform on resource allocation. 
The “deterred, rejected, and accepted claims” sec-
tion of Table 5 shows that, taking deterred claims 
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into account, the post-reform cumulative distribu-
tion over priority classes ordered from I through IV 
dominates the pre-reform distribution, meaning 
that on this criterion, the reform represents an im-
provement. Our indicator for QALYs generated per 
expenditure of 100 times GDP per capita “set aside” 
for dealing with possible claims tells the same sto-
ry. It is given in the green-highlighted cells in the 
“deterred, rejected and accepted claims” section of 
Table 6. These reveal that when one takes account of 
all three apparent effects of the reform, the reform 
has had a net positive effect on the criterion we have 
focused on, increasing the estimated number of 
QALYs generated for this fixed, claim-related bud-
get by 14%. In sum, our analysis estimates that the 
combined effect of (1) the shift away from granted 
claims to experimental medicines, (2) the increase 
in the acceptance rate of claims to medicines, and 
(3) the reduction in the number of claims for med-
ication is a moderate improvement in the fairness 
of overall health resource allocation. Importantly, 
because claims are overwhelmingly for low-priority 
medications even post-reform, a principal route to 
this likely beneficial impact is the reform’s apparent 
deterrent effect on claims.
Limitations
While we address several lacunae in Rodríguez 
Loaiza et al.’s analysis, our arguments also inherit 
some key limitations of their data. One is that we 
use their priority classification, which, as they note, 
is only one reasonable way to classify cases. Anoth-
er is that the estimates of individual QALY gain and 
cost-effectiveness of medicines are subject to a great 
deal of uncertainty. These estimates depend cru-
cially on both the assumed comparison treatment 
(e.g. is the comparison “no treatment at all,” or is it 
some alternative medication?) and the country and 
health system context (e.g. the estimated cost per 
QALY of a treatment can be much higher in, say, 
a private health provider in the United States than 
in a public provider in a middle-income country). 
But due to the limitations of the available literature, 
the studies from which our estimates are derived 
cannot always match the Costa Rican context. 
Moreover, the cost-effectiveness estimates of exper-
imental treatments are subject to great uncertainty, 
because the effects of these medicines are highly 
uncertain. In addition, in future work on this topic 
based on new data, it would be better to replace our 
indirect estimates of the expenditure occasioned by 
each accepted claim with more direct observations.
A third limitation is that while we can estab-
lish statistically significant and important post- and 
pre-reform differences, our methods cannot estab-
lish that these differences are caused by the reform. 
An important avenue for further research would be 
to investigate the causal mechanisms behind the 
observed changes. 
A fourth limitation is that our analysis of the 
joint impact of these differences relies on many 
assumptions and that our estimates are therefore 
quite uncertain. Most prominent among them is 
the assumption (for which we have offered indirect 
empirical support) that money not spent on meeting 
claims is spent by the CCSS on high-priority health 
interventions with an indicative cost of 0.5 GDP per 
capita per QALY. Fortunately, as mentioned above, 
our qualitative findings are unaffected even if we 
make the far weaker assumption that the cost-effec-
tiveness of CCSS general expenditure falls just about 
anywhere in the high- to medium-priority range.
Finally, our quantitative analysis does not con-
sider a different aspect of fair priority setting, which 
is that there must be room for effective challenge to 
and revision of decisions. It therefore ignores the 
salutary effects that a culture of frequent challenge 
may have on the CCSS’s functioning and the legit-
imacy of its priority-setting process.31 While the 
volume of writs of protection for health remains 
substantial, it is worth examining whether the new 
process has created undue barriers for some patients 
to challenge the denial of medication by the CCSS. 
We also note that the estimated net effect may not 
be permanent. If the deterrent effect on claims of 
the reforms was in part due to uncertainty among 
claimants about their chances of success under the 
new regime, then the number of cases might start 
rising again once lawyers and potential claimants 
notice the good post-reform prospects of success 
for claims to medication of proven effectiveness.
a. luciano and a. voorhoeve / general papers, 283-293
292
D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 9    V O L U M E  2 1    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal
Conclusion 
We have investigated whether the cooperation 
between the Costa Rican constitutional court and 
the Cochrane Collaboration has helped reconcile 
health rights litigation and fair priority setting. 
Under this reform, a person advancing a claim for 
medication is typically referred to an independent 
forensic doctor, who evaluates the appropriateness 
of the prescribed medication using the Cochrane 
medical databases. We performed a novel analysis 
of data provided by Rodríguez Loaiza et al. on the 
apparent effects of this reform. We found that the 
reform coincided with three substantial and sta-
tistically significant changes: (1) among successful 
cases, an increase in the proportion of high-priority 
cases and a decrease in the proportion of experi-
mental cases; (2) an increase in the overall success 
rate of cases; and (3) a decrease in the number of 
claims for medicine. We have also analyzed these 
changes’ joint impact. Under the assumption that 
the funds that are not spent on meeting court-ap-
proved claims are spent by the Costa Rican public 
sector on high-priority interventions, these three 
changes work in opposing directions. The reduction 
in successful claims to experimental medications 
represents an important improvement. Indeed, 
we estimate that it reduces the average cost per 
QALY for accepted claims by around one-third, 
from roughly 9 to roughly 6 times GDP per capita 
per QALY. However, as these numbers indicate, 
even post-reform, approved claims typically lead 
to extremely cost-ineffective spending. It follows 
that the increase in the acceptance rate of claims 
has a strongly negative effect on overall resource 
allocation, since it prompts more such low-priority 
spending. But for the same reason, the substan-
tial drop in the number of claims to medication 
coinciding with the reform has been beneficial, 
since it permits public spending to flow toward 
high-priority interventions. We estimate that if or-
dinary public spending on health is indeed on such 
high-priority interventions, then the joint effect of 
all three changes is a moderate improvement in the 
fairness of overall health spending. 
We conclude that the Cochrane Collaboration 
reform appears to have reduced the number of 
successful claims for unproven drugs and there-
fore probably represents a good first step toward 
reconciling fair priority setting with the right to 
health in Costa Rica. However, a large majority 
of successful claims are still for drugs that are not 
remotely cost-effective. It therefore seems advisable 
to further change the process of evaluation of such 
claims to take account of priority-setting criteria 
besides mere evidence of effectiveness, including 
cost-effectiveness and severity of disease.32 
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